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Your inquisitiveness in this regard is indicative of the level of understanding that is just beginning to take center stage in the world of RCM and reliability in general. Typical examples are prevalent throughout industry. That includes industries and facilities as diverse as a manufacturing plant, a chemical plant, a refinery, a commercial aircraft, the space shuttle, a nuclear power plant, an off-shore oil drilling platform, or even a shoe factory. The "unknown consequences" most often manifest themselves due to the lack of understanding of how to really analyze "hidden failures" and the inaccurate categorization of run-to-failure as a choice of strategy for a component that is NOT really run-to-failure.
It is the "unknown consequences" that have the greatest potential to cause a catastrophic event. As I mentioned in my previous post, the late John Moubray, who was a colleague of mine for over 20 years, was also in agreement with me on this issue. A very typical example, that I mention in my book, occurred, not in a third world country but right here at a U.
One of the major safety systems of the main megawatt turbine was considered so important that the designer included "triple redundancy" so that a runaway turbine due to an uncontrolled overspeed would never occur. The bottom line is that The turbine blew apart and only by luck, no one was killed. The incorrect categorization of run-to-failure and the "unknown consequences" surrounding this event are all too common.
Let me also set the stage here for something else to consider. A nuclear power plant probably has more technical expertise on site than any other entity. There are several hundred engineers, scientists, reliability experts, quality assurance inspectors, component experts, maintenance specialists, and a whole host of many other technical types that reside on site. To provide you with another real-life recent example, consider the fire and explosion at the BP oil refinery in Texas.
Seventeen people were killed and many others injured. This incident was so significant that BP convened a special investigation panel led by the former Secretary of State, James Baker. I could go on and on with a litany of other such typical examples. The theme I am bringing to industry in my book and in my speaking engagements throughout the country is that it is not the "usual suspects" that cause the major disasters.
It is not the components that everyone knows is a problem that have the greatest potential to wreak havoc on your facility; it is the "unknown failure consequences" and the incorrectly invoked categorization of run-to-failure that poses the greatest threat to safety and reliability. If you did not see the article, I have attached a copy of it below. Reliability Centered Maintenance, or RCM as it is called, is a term used in the reliability community by different folks to mean different things.
Reliability people in various industries around the world truly want to improve their preventive maintenance programs and there are innumerable of ways to accomplish that goal.
The thinking goes like this Through no fault of their own, most people do not know what RCM really is. For example, the phrase Or perhaps another typical example such as; In reality, what they actually want to implement is a PM Optimization program. What these folks actually want is to convert time directed overhauls into condition monitoring predictive maintenance tasks These are all wonderful things to do and I wholeheartedly endorse all of them as well as a whole host of other such peripheral betterment issues.
The primary reason for implementing an RCM program is to identify components whose functional failures can cause unwanted consequences to ones plant or facility. So why do people call these peripheral programs an RCM program? Usually, it is because it sounds better. It has a cache of professionalism, authenticity, and technical credentials associated with it. It is like buying a "NASA inspired space developed mattress" which sounds much more technically state of the art than describing it as a "foam mattress that does not move when you jump on it"!
The disasters caused by these two reasons are "surprises" because they were totally unknown, unexpected and unanalyzed. Many of these disasters were caused by failures of rather innocuous or non-obvious components. A PM Optimization program would have little or no chance to ferret out those component failure consequences.
The "unexpected" disaster can also take place with the misguided conception that redundant components "automatically qualify for a run-to-failure" status. In the absence of identifying what I have termed "potentially critical" components, a hidden failure can go undetected if there is no indication of the failure and if there is no immediate consequence of the failure until another failure takes place in combination with the first failure.
Worse yet, one unexpected disaster can shut your facility down for good. The real-life examples of major disaster occurrences are bountiful with the latest BP explosion in Texas being just one of them. Even when we believe that we really do need an RCM program and not a PM Optimization effort, why do we take shortcuts that are commonly called streamlined or truncated RCM? We take them only because RCM has been made so difficult and costly to implement that it is mostly shied away from except for mega corporations with megabucks to spend.
RCM usually ends up as an unsuccessful venture, even for the mega corporations. This does not have to be the case. Most people believe a comprehensive RCM program takes a team of 6 or more people, three or four years to complete.
That could take at least 18 man-years! It does not have to be that way. In fact it is not fair to have senior management believe such a myth. I did this because obviously there are components in every plant or facility that have no real function Think about it, if a truly functional component was designed into your plant, it is there for a reason.
It was not developed to be used on a pick and choose basis. In fact nowhere in the document does it say it can be used selectively. Remember, an RCM analysis is employed to "identify" components whose functional failures can result in unwanted plant consequences. If you are already clairvoyant and know what those components are there is really no need to pursue an RCM program.
In such a case, RCM would be a waste of time and money. Of course there are those components whose criticality is well known. That is a given. That is what maintenance budgets are made for. There are myriad critical components in that population just waiting to cause a disaster.
In fact, it is within that "unanalyzed" population of components, that your disaster is most likely to occur! Keep in mind; it is the non-obvious and the rather innocuous components whose failure consequences have the greatest potential for wreaking havoc upon your facility.
As delineated in my book, I liken this to buying car insurance that insures you only while you are driving 65 mph on a freeway or while you are driving in heavy traffic, when you believe an accident is most likely to occur.
You would not be insured driving on country roads, or driving slowly through your neighborhood to and from work, or driving on any nonbusy roads because it is assumed you would not have an accident under those conditions. You would assume the risk of having no insurance coverage during these times. Does that sound comforting? Statistically, when do most accidents occur?
They occur within a few miles of home. Many astute reliability professionals have begun to understand this logic. They understand that one unanticipated functional failure consequence can totally wipe out any routinely generated maintenance budget that was put together by including maintenance expenses only for the well known problem components that I refer to as the "usual suspects.
To put all of the aforementioned into a clearer and more focused picture, look at RCM as having three phases associated with it. The 1st phase is the heart and soul of the process. It is where the population of equipment requiring preventive maintenance is identified. This is the phase where RCM decision logic comes into play. Phase 1 is the "engine" of the process.
The 2nd phase is to specify the tasks that will be scheduled on the population identified in phase 1. This second phase is where condition monitoring, predictive maintenance techniques and the use of cookie-cutter PM task templates are specified. The 3rd phase is the actual implementation of the specified tasks. Look at the 3 phases of RCM like you would look at a car. For example, the heart and soul of the car is the engine. Even though a car has many different facets to it such as tires, brakes, windshield wipers, seats, windows, and so on, it is the engine that singularly defines the car.
All other facets of the car are peripheral to the engine. If it is really a PM betterment program you are after, tell your management that you are embarking on a program to reduce known costs. There is a major difference between a program such as RCM which is designed for truly enhancing safety and reliability and its concomitant cost avoidance benefits such as avoiding potential disasters and a PM betterment program which is strictly an economic exercise implemented solely to reduce known costs.
In virtually every case, any type of true RCM effort will result in certain INCREASED costs because certain previously unknown failure consequences will be addressed and hence, those components will need to be continuously maintained within the preventive maintenance program. The real benefit of RCM is its ability to ferret out those components whose failure consequences were previously unknown so that they can be appropriately addressed to avoid an unwanted disaster.
Obviously, avoiding unwanted disasters has enormous cost avoidance benefits. However, if your facility is such that the worst thing that can happen is within the realm of acceptance by your senior management, then RCM is not really needed.
A PM betterment program is what should be pursued. He is a mechanical engineer with over 35 years of both hands-on and senior level managerial engineering and maintenance experience in RCM and Preventive Maintenance Programs in the commercial aviation and commercial nuclear power industries.
His website is www.
On-line and Outage work Management Ineffective work management results in the inability to repair failed or degraded equipment in a timely manner, increased costs of operating the facility, and frustration among workers and leaders. INPO has developed guidelines for both on-line and outage work management. However, plants still have problems in implementing the process to efficiently and effectively execute planned work. CALM has supported facilities in improving the performance of both on-line and outage work management execution. The first step of this support is to assess the current performance to identify gaps between this level of performance and excellence. Based on this assessment, CALM works with management to develop and implement a specific improvement plan.
INPO AP-929, Rev.1
Vudoshura Additionally, monitoring and minimizing PMs in the second half of their grace period is important to assure that none become delinquent or require deferral. Many stations have evolved effective processes that work for them and provide for reasonable and consistent prioritization of work. If parts will not be available by the preparation milestone, identify the restraint. The traveler should be started by maintenance planners during package development and be added to as the package is reviewed and walked down. Work will result in a change in intent of work instructions or method of repair.
INPO AP-913 | AMP Maintenance Forums
Not for sale nor for commercial use. All other rights reserved. Neither INPO, INPO members, INPO participants, nor any person acting on the behalf of them a makes any warranty or representation, expressed or implied, with respect to the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this document, or that the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document may not infringe on privately owned rights, or b assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for damages resulting from the use of any information, apparatus, method, or process disclosed in this document. The objective of configuration management is to maintain consistency among the design requirements, the physical plant configuration, and the facility configuration information FCI. The configuration management process is one of an integrated set of processes for the operation and support of nuclear plants. It encompasses activities that evaluate the need to change station configuration, determine the impact of the change, establish the optimum implementation method, and complete the necessary development and approval steps to produce an approved, implemented, and documented change to the station configuration.
INPO AP 928 PDF
Dailar Radiation or contamination b. Feedback from workers is essential to establish the correct level of detail for work packages and to qp work package content. There is no immediate safety concern because a chain has been installed. The short-cycle process is used for the management and implementation of work as defined in Appendix C of this document.